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Case No. 18151 
ADDITIONAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
The Court has requested additional briefing in this matter on 
the question of whether Sections 76-2-101 and 76-2-102, Utah 
Criminal Code, have any application in cases brought under Section 
76-5-401, Utah Criminal Code. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNLAWFUL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS NOT A STRICT LIABILITY CRIME. 
Section 76-2-102, Utah Criminal Code, specifically sets forth 
the definition of a strict liability crime. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require 
a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable mental state, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict 
liability only when a statute defining the offense clearly 
indicates a legislative purpose to impose strict liability 
for the conduct by use of the phrase "strict liability" 
or other terms of similar import. 
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The legislature carefully defined a narrow situation when a 
crime could involve strict liability. If the statute does not meet 
the narrow classification, it is not a strict liabililty crime. 
The statute establishing a strict liability crime must clearly 
indicate a legislative purpose to make the crime strict liability. 
This clear purpose is indicate~ by use of the phrase "strict 
liability" or other terms of similar import. 
A careful examination of Section 76-5-401{1), Utah Criminal 
Code, reveals that the words "strict liability" are not us~. 
There are no terms in Section 76-5-401(1) of similar import to the 
term "strict liability." The only thing we can learn from an 
examination of Section 76-5-401{1) is that terms relating to a 
culpable state of mind, such as "knowingly, intentionally, or 
recklessly," are absent. 
In the case of People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1980), 
the Colorado Supreme Court considered the consequences of an 
absence of words relating to a culpable mental state: 
Legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal 
statute generally is not construed as an indication that 
no culpable mental state is required. The United States 
Supreme Court, interpreting federal legislation, has held 
that, by definition, a crime ordinarily requires the con-
junction of an act and a culpable mental state. 
620 P.2d at 3. 
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A crime does not become a strict liability crime from the 
absence of words related to a culpable state of mind. To be a 
strict liability crime, the statute must contain the words "strict 
liability" or words of similar import. 
Since the terms "strict liability" or terms of similar import 
are not contained in Section 76-5-401(1), Utah Criminal Code, the 
crime defined by that section is not a strict liability crime. The 
status of "strict liability" is restricted to those statutes which 
clearly indicate that the legislature affirmatively intended the 
statute to be strict liability. In the absence of such a clear 
indication, the Court can only assume that the legislature did not 
intend to have Section 76-5-401(1) define.a "strict liability" 
crime. 
This concept has been analyzed in other states as well as 
Utah. In the case of Spitz v. Municipal Court of City of Phoenix, 
621 P.2d 911 (Ariz. 1980), the Arizona Court stated: 
The requirement of wrongful intent or mens rea in criminal 
cases, however, is the rule rather than the exception, 
(citation omitted), and we will resolve any doubt in fav~r 
of a requirement of criminal intent unless there is 
manifested a clear legislative intent that the crime does 
not require such guilty knowledge. 621 P.2d at 913. 
Only in rare circumstances may a statute define a crime 
involving strict liability. If those requirements are not met, the 
statute is like any other statute requiring a culpable mental 
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state. Unless the statute contains express indication that it is 
to be a strict liability crime, any doubt must be resolved in 
favor of requiring proof of a culpable mental state. 
POINT II. 
MISTAKE OF FACT MAY BE USED AS A DEFENSE IF THE MISTAKE DISPROVES 
THE CULPABLE MENTAL STATE. 
It is clear from Section 76-2-304, Utah Criminal Code, that a 
mistake of fact can be a defense to a crime if the mistake 
disproves the culpable mental state. 
Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact 
which disproves the culpable mental state is a defense 
to any prosecution for that crime. 
Before mistake of fact can be used as a defense, it must be 
shown that the crime is one which requires proof of a culpable 
mental. Since the crime of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse is not a 
strict liability crime as shown above, and since it is a crime 
which requires proof of a culpable mental state, mistake of fact 
may be used as a defense where the mistake disproves the culpable 
mental state. The questions of whether the mistake of fact exists 
and whether the mistake disproves the culpable mental state are 
questions of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since Section 76-5-401(1), Utah Criminal Code, does not use 
the term "strict liability" or terms of similar import, it is not 
a strict liability crime. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of 
requiring proof of a culpable mental state unless the statute 
expressly provides for strict liability. Section 76-5-401(1) does 
not contain such an express provision and should, therefore 
require proof of a culpable mental state. 
Mistake of fact may be a defense to prosecution for a crime 
if that mistake disproves the culpable mental state required to 
prove that crime. Since Section 76-5-401(1) requires proof of a 
culpable mental state, a mistake of fact may be a defense to 
prosecution under that section. A reasonable belief that the 
victim is over the age of 16 is a mistake of fact which can 
disprove the culpable mental state involved in such a prosecution. 
The case should be remanded for a new trial with the jury being 
allowed to consider whether the Appellant's belief was reasonable 
and whether that belief disproves the culpable mental state. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /~ day of November, 1982. 
Kent o. Willis 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Additional Brief of Appellant to David L. 
Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /~t-4 day of November, 1982. 
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